big serge substack

Big serge substack

In the last 72 hours or so, the pro-Russian side of the internet has been sent into an tailspin of panic over a new Ukrainian counteroffensive which is currently being launched in big serge substack Kharkov region, with the intention of compromising the Russian army grouping at Izyum.

As the calendar barrels into another year and we tick away the days of February, notable anniversaries are marked off in sequence. The nature of the war changed dramatically after a kinetic and mobile opening phase. With the collapse of the negotiation process whether thanks to Boris Johnson or not , it became clear that the only way out of the conflict would be through the strategic defeat of one party by the other. Thanks to a pipeline of western support in the form of material, financial aid, and ISR and targeting assistance which allowed Ukraine to transcend its rapidly evaporating indigenous war economy, it became clear that this would be a war of industrial attrition, rather than rapid maneuver and annihilation. Russia began to mobilize resources for this sort of attritional war in the Autumn of , and since then the war has attained its present quality - that of a firepower intensive but relatively static positional struggle. The nature of this attritional-positional war lends itself to analytic ambiguity, because it denies the most attractive and obvious signs of victory and defeat in large territorial changes.

Big serge substack

Military history writer Big Serge has published an excellent essay that explains much of what has puzzled observers of the conflict in Ukraine—why does Russia appear to be hanging back, what happened to that much touted offensive, and some other matters as well. First, however, here are some basic points that will serve as guide posts. Russia, for political reasons, has not yet declared war on Ukraine—the conflict remains, legally, a Special Military Operation. Legality is very important to him, as we know from his criticisms of the Rules-Based Order, in which the rules are unilaterally made up on the go. A declaration of war may or may not happen, but the lack of such a declaration at this point places constraints on the Russian military. The Russian military is composed of a professional military—personnel who are on contract—and conscripts. Conscripts serve only for a limited time and are mostly trainees for most of their service. Importantly, they cannot be used outside the Russian Federation unless there has been a declaration of war. This lack of full complements is being solved through the mobilization, but the problem of integrating the call-ups into the new organizational structure remains a work in progress. The incorporation of several formerly Ukrainian oblasts into the Russian Federation has obviated some of the legal difficulties, but the organizational problems are still being worked through. Where is the big Russian offensive? So either a giant offensive will happen any minute now it might have just started while I was typing that , or it will never happen at all, or it already happened, or Russia is currently driving the attrition of the Ukrainian army and denying Ukraine any chance at regaining operational initiative, while at the same time pursuing important shaping objectives. I believe this is occurring against the backdrop of moderate, but not catastrophic organizational disorder and restructuring in the Russian armed forces, which are delaying its readiness to launch a large scale offensive.

In any case, big serge substack, the legalities are not the main point here. Secondly, the Upstream effects disroportionately affect Russia as well. Hence, Kiev - buit originally as a timber fortified trading post to ease passage along the middle Dnieper.

Check this out me korosho drugies: bigserge. This guy is fucking hilarious. Kyive was a trap. Kharkiv was a trap. Lyman was a trap. Kherson is a trap.

Science is a rigorous, systematic endeavor that builds and organizes knowledge in the form of testable explanations and predictions about the world. The history of science spans the majority of the historical record, with the earliest written records of identifiable predecessors to modern science dating to Bronze Age Egypt and Mesopotamia from around to BCE. Their contributions to mathematics, astronomy , and medicine entered and shaped the Greek natural philosophy of classical antiquity , whereby formal attempts were made to provide explanations of events in the physical world based on natural causes, while further advancements, including the introduction of the Hindu—Arabic numeral system , were made during the Golden Age of India. Some Greek manuscripts lost in Western Europe were preserved and expanded upon in the Middle East during the Islamic Golden Age [19] and later by the efforts of Byzantine Greek scholars who brought Greek manuscripts from the dying Byzantine Empire to Western Europe in the Renaissance. The recovery and assimilation of Greek works and Islamic inquiries into Western Europe from the 10th to 13th century revived " natural philosophy ", [20] [21] [22] which was later transformed by the Scientific Revolution that began in the 16th century [23] as new ideas and discoveries departed from previous Greek conceptions and traditions. New knowledge in science is advanced by research from scientists who are motivated by curiosity about the world and a desire to solve problems. The word science has been used in Middle English since the 14th century in the sense of "the state of knowing".

Big serge substack

It has been a while since I published anything long-form commenting on the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War, and I confess that writing this article gave me a modicum of trouble. The summer has seen fierce fighting in a variety of sectors to be enumerated below , but the contact line has shifted very little. I have been reluctant to publish a discussion of the Ukrainian campaign simply because they have continued to hold assets in reserve, and I did not want to post a premature commentary that went to press right before the Ukrainians showed some new trick or revealed a hidden ace up their sleeve.

R27er

The operation at Avdiivka was a high intensity, four month battle. The current Theory of Ukrainian Victory is exhausted, intending as it did to leverage western ISR, training, and surplus equipment to deliver disproportionate casualties on Russia. It means mass casualties, cold trenches, scarred earth, and long nights of shelling. Frontline positions are, relatively speaking, thinly manned, which powerful mobile reserves are held back. The problem is that it allows Ukraine to temporarily retake settlements, which exposes the civilians in these areas to reprisal killings, such as occurred in Bucha. A popular point being raised by the Ukrainian infosphere is the fact that the Kakhovka dam was under Russian control - therefore, they argue that only Russia could have planted explosives to create a breach at this point, we do not know the precise technical method used to create the breach. With the dam now breached, they have lost this control. Thierry Bruno Jun 7, Having admitted that it could only have been the Ukraine that had blown up the dam even if it may have been done with the help of some twisted Western service - British, of course , I had come to the same conclusion as you: the Ukrainians and their allies are completely losing it, especially as they've also just blown up an ammonia pipeline. We are taking heavy losses. Not only is it washing out Russian defenses and disproportionately disrupting the Russian side of the river, but Russia has now lost the ability to create a flood at the opportune moment later on.

I want to draw attention to a fine, thoughtful article by Big Serge. The Age of Zugzwang. Zugzwang, of course, is a term from chess.

Legality is very important to him, as we know from his criticisms of the Rules-Based Order, in which the rules are unilaterally made up on the go. Share this discussion. Copy link. Or is there someone in Washington not intoxicated enough by the lies of his own camp to blow the whistle on the bullshit? Artillery barrels, needless to say, wear out from extended use. A commander who complains about battleplans while implementing them anyway is begging an obvious question: what is it that you do around here, anyway? Because Russia has redundant supply lines to the northeast of Izyum, for Ukraine to reach operational depth, they must cross the Donets and Oskil rivers. This is all very interesting, of course, and perhaps might help demonstrate that the relationship between these countries is far more convoluted and nuanced that most westerners assume. While these attacks have, as we have mentioned, attritional benefits by way of pinning Ukrainian forces in the line, it seems likely that Russia would aim to recapture the Robotyne salient to preempt any Ukrainian designs of using it as a springboard for a future attempt to restart operations towards Tokmak. The panic that set in on the Russian side on the internet, at least, for there is no evidence that the Russian armed forces panicked was due to the perception that Ukraine was advancing unopposed towards the east, rapidly approaching Kupyansk and doing… something, to Balakliya. Substack is the home for great writing. Please turn on JavaScript or unblock scripts.

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